There were so many things that I learned from this class. I'm pretty sure I know the Seminole systems inside and out now, and I really think I have a good understanding for how they work. I also learned quite a bit about critical engines on a multi-engine aircraft. Before this class, I didn't know that losing a particular engine can have a much greater effect on the performance of the aircraft. Conveniently on the Seminole, we have counterrotating props so that neither engine is critical. Another thing I got from the class is a lot of good decision-making skills and examples of what to do and what not to do. Learning about the Aspen Arrival crash really opened my eyes to all the factors that can influence the outcome of a flight, and that sometimes even the most obvious things can be overlooked.
I honestly don't think I would really change anything about the class, except maybe the time. I'm not a fan of 8 a.m. classes, and sometimes that made it hard to concentrate because I was still pretty tired. I do understand of course that the time is not really something that can be changed. Someone has to have the early slot, and it just happened to be us.
I thought blogging was a pretty cool way to do the assignments. It made it so you could almost "personalize" your homework and it really made it more enjoyable and less like work. It also saves paper!
Finally, here's the one big thing I liked about this class... It was a multi-engine ground school, but it was also an advanced aircraft kind of class. We learned that with a bigger aircraft comes more responsibilities as PIC. Most likely we will be flying multi-engine aircraft for our career and this was a good starting point to all the different aspects of the career.
Saturday, October 9, 2010
Aspen Arrival
When reading about the Aspen Arrival accident, it's so easy to find multiple ways that the accident could have been prevented. It all starts with knowing how to cope with pressure and setting your own limits as PIC of an aircraft. I have had to make many go/no-go decisions during my training and sometimes it isn't so easy.
I believe the first mistake was simply allowing the customers to override their decision just because they paid a lot of money for this trip. It was their fault for being late, and leaving 41 minutes later than the scheduled departure put them very close to the night curfew. As we saw, their flight briefing mentioned occasional IFR, which in Aspen is a cause for concern, ESPECIALLY at night. The FSS briefer also noted that the circle-to-land procedures for the only instrument approach into Aspen was no longer permitted at night. As we learned later in the article, that information was not passed along correctly to everyone involved (i.e. controller at Aspen) and the Gulfstream was cleared for that approach when it never should have been.
There were many other factors that should have been different in this situation. Why did they let someone ride in the jumpseat? I have a feeling that that was somewhat of a distraction during the approach. Why did they let the passengers override their decision to divert to the alternate? Their alternate destination had 10 miles visibility and skies clear below 12,000 at the time of the crash. Why did they not remember that the circling approach was not authorized? They were told this during the briefing and should not have accepted the approach from the controller, especially after 2 preceding aircraft had gone missed. That right there is a live PIREP. They couldn't do it, so why did this crew believe that they could? All of these were things that contributed to the accident and could have easily been avoided.
Of course, I have a feeling that it would be pretty difficult for me if I was in this situation. I worked so hard to get this job and to get where I am in my career... It would be really hard for me to make this decision that could get me in big trouble, or even fired. However, I think that I'd much rather be alive and in trouble instead of dead because of poor decision-making. I have a feeling that if the passengers knew the danger of what they were "forcing" the pilots to do, they would not have been so adamant to get to their fancy dinner.
-TB
I believe the first mistake was simply allowing the customers to override their decision just because they paid a lot of money for this trip. It was their fault for being late, and leaving 41 minutes later than the scheduled departure put them very close to the night curfew. As we saw, their flight briefing mentioned occasional IFR, which in Aspen is a cause for concern, ESPECIALLY at night. The FSS briefer also noted that the circle-to-land procedures for the only instrument approach into Aspen was no longer permitted at night. As we learned later in the article, that information was not passed along correctly to everyone involved (i.e. controller at Aspen) and the Gulfstream was cleared for that approach when it never should have been.
There were many other factors that should have been different in this situation. Why did they let someone ride in the jumpseat? I have a feeling that that was somewhat of a distraction during the approach. Why did they let the passengers override their decision to divert to the alternate? Their alternate destination had 10 miles visibility and skies clear below 12,000 at the time of the crash. Why did they not remember that the circling approach was not authorized? They were told this during the briefing and should not have accepted the approach from the controller, especially after 2 preceding aircraft had gone missed. That right there is a live PIREP. They couldn't do it, so why did this crew believe that they could? All of these were things that contributed to the accident and could have easily been avoided.
Of course, I have a feeling that it would be pretty difficult for me if I was in this situation. I worked so hard to get this job and to get where I am in my career... It would be really hard for me to make this decision that could get me in big trouble, or even fired. However, I think that I'd much rather be alive and in trouble instead of dead because of poor decision-making. I have a feeling that if the passengers knew the danger of what they were "forcing" the pilots to do, they would not have been so adamant to get to their fancy dinner.
-TB
Thursday, October 7, 2010
PCATD
I completed the PCATD assignment with Kenny on 10/7/10.
Starting Hobbs: 1941.6
Ending Hobbs: 1942.1
Total: 0.5
Starting Hobbs: 1941.6
Ending Hobbs: 1942.1
Total: 0.5
Seminole Observation
I completed my observation flight on Tuesday, October, 5 2010 with David Atkinson and Dilpreet.
Tail number: Seminole N978WC
Starting Tach: 2912.8
Ending Tach: 2913.9
Starting Hobbs: 4078.0
Ending Hobbs: 4079.7
Total Hobbs: 1.7
This was definitely an exciting flight! It was very beneficial to me to be able to just watch and see how everything is done. Many of the operations are the same in the multi, but you just have to do them twice. It was David's first time flying with Dilpreet so we took things a little slower and more in depth. This made it even easier for me to understand how things worked and the proper procedures for operating the aircraft.
One of the first things I noticed is that there are many more things to check on the initial startup and then on the run-up before takeoff. Like I said, you have to do everything twice. You have 4 mags to check instead of only 2, and you have 2 mixtures to set also, etc. So, the run-up took a little longer than I expected. During the run-up, one of the mags dropped past its limit and so Dilpreet showed us a good fix for that. He said that this is most likely due to carbon deposits/build-up in the cylinders, which is caused from running the engine with a mixture that is too rich. He told us to lean the mixture to the hottest EGT (peak EGT) and then run the engine at a high RPM for a few seconds to burn off the deposits. It worked perfectly! I thought that was really cool and I definitely didn't know that the fix was so simple.
The next big difference I noticed was the increased pace of everything. There is more to keep up with in the airplane and less time to do it because of how fast you go. It is definitely manageable, though. One factor may have been the increased radio communication because we decided to go to Ogden since Tooele had some questionable weather. Anyway, it was pretty cool to see the performance increase with 2 engines. We were able to do a cruise climb at 105 KIAS up to our altitude for maneuvering. It was pleasing to see a climb of over 500 FPM with a groundspeed of around 120 knots.
The maneuvers that we did (stalls, slow flight, and steep turns) seemed to be generally the same as in the other planes, as well as the instrument flying that David did under the hood. It was definitely a fun flight and I'm glad I got to experience the plane and see the operating procedures before I actually fly it myself. I think that will be beneficial a couple months down the road when I get into the plane to do my training.
-TB
Tail number: Seminole N978WC
Starting Tach: 2912.8
Ending Tach: 2913.9
Starting Hobbs: 4078.0
Ending Hobbs: 4079.7
Total Hobbs: 1.7
This was definitely an exciting flight! It was very beneficial to me to be able to just watch and see how everything is done. Many of the operations are the same in the multi, but you just have to do them twice. It was David's first time flying with Dilpreet so we took things a little slower and more in depth. This made it even easier for me to understand how things worked and the proper procedures for operating the aircraft.
One of the first things I noticed is that there are many more things to check on the initial startup and then on the run-up before takeoff. Like I said, you have to do everything twice. You have 4 mags to check instead of only 2, and you have 2 mixtures to set also, etc. So, the run-up took a little longer than I expected. During the run-up, one of the mags dropped past its limit and so Dilpreet showed us a good fix for that. He said that this is most likely due to carbon deposits/build-up in the cylinders, which is caused from running the engine with a mixture that is too rich. He told us to lean the mixture to the hottest EGT (peak EGT) and then run the engine at a high RPM for a few seconds to burn off the deposits. It worked perfectly! I thought that was really cool and I definitely didn't know that the fix was so simple.
The next big difference I noticed was the increased pace of everything. There is more to keep up with in the airplane and less time to do it because of how fast you go. It is definitely manageable, though. One factor may have been the increased radio communication because we decided to go to Ogden since Tooele had some questionable weather. Anyway, it was pretty cool to see the performance increase with 2 engines. We were able to do a cruise climb at 105 KIAS up to our altitude for maneuvering. It was pleasing to see a climb of over 500 FPM with a groundspeed of around 120 knots.
The maneuvers that we did (stalls, slow flight, and steep turns) seemed to be generally the same as in the other planes, as well as the instrument flying that David did under the hood. It was definitely a fun flight and I'm glad I got to experience the plane and see the operating procedures before I actually fly it myself. I think that will be beneficial a couple months down the road when I get into the plane to do my training.
-TB
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